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Abstract: The manner in which Aircraft Communica-
tions, Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is
being used has significantly changed over time. Whilst
originally used by commercial airliners to track their
flights and provide automated timekeeping on crew, to-
day it serves as a multi-purpose air-ground data link for
many aviation stakeholders including private jet owners,
state actors and military. Since ACARS messages are
still mostly sent in the clear over a wireless channel, any
sensitive information sent with ACARS can potentially
lead to a privacy breach for users. Naturally, different
stakeholders consider different types of data sensitive.
In this paper we propose a privacy framework matching
aviation stakeholders to a range of sensitive information
types and assess the impact for each. Based on more
than one million ACARS messages, collected over sev-
eral months, we then demonstrate that current ACARS
usage systematically breaches privacy for all stakeholder
groups. We further support our findings with a number
of cases of significant privacy issues for each group and
analyze the impact of such leaks. While it is well-known
that ACARS messages are susceptible to eavesdropping
attacks, this work is the first to quantify the extent and
impact of privacy leakage in the real world for the rele-
vant aviation stakeholders.
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1 Introduction
Recently, potential privacy issues of aviation data be-
came apparent through a series of high-profile cases.
Both criminals and journalists, amongst others, ex-
ploited this type of data. Of the former, financial traders
used aircraft movements to track potential deals to later
use for insider trading [8], in others flights relating to
alleged gold smuggling were hidden [17]. An example of
the latter comes in the movements at Geneva airport
identifying regular flights relating to Teodoro Obiang
Nguema Mbasogo, the incumbent President of Equito-
rial Guinea, wanted in Europe on charges of embezzle-
ment [30, 47]. This led to the creation of a Twitter ac-
count, GVA Dictator Alert, reporting on aircraft belong-
ing to alleged dictators arriving at Geneva airport [30].
Privacy in aviation is rapidly becoming hard to achieve
and is being further hindered by outdated, insecure sys-
tems.
As with many areas of transport, aviation strives for
becoming more ‘connected’, utilizing modern data link
technologies to improve efficiency. However, data link
usage is not new to aviation; since the 1970’s, links of
some form have been used to transfer data to aircraft.
A prime example is the Aircraft Communications, Ad-
dressing and Reporting System (ACARS), which has
evolved from being a single purpose tool primarily for
commercial aviation to being widely deployed on many
types of aircraft.
ACARS provides data link communications be-
tween aircraft and entities on the ground and is used for
many different purposes, from air traffic control (ATC)
to management of aircraft fleet. Using a basic ASCII
character set, a range of messaging formats and proto-
cols are defined to provide services. However, the system
was not designed with security in mind, with solutions
being offered much later as add-ons. This means that the
vast majority of ACARS traffic is in the clear. With a
variety of stakeholders each with differing requirements,
it has gradually begun to be used for purposes it is not
equipped to handle.
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One way this manifests itself is in leaking a signif-
icant amount of private data. Some messages overtly
leak sensitive information—particularly in the case of
commercial aircraft, efforts to transfer data to make
the passenger experience better often breach privacy.
We observed instances of medical information and full
credit card details being transferred via ACARS. On top
of this, some messages which initially appear innocuous
can also leak significant amounts of information. For
stakeholders who wish to, e.g., hide flight information,
ACARS messages are regularly used to report position
or their destinations and route thus undermining this
effort.
Indeed, concerns about privacy in ACARS have
been highlighted by a number of unofficial sources. As
far back as 1998, discussion on the clear-text nature of
avionic data link highlighted the leakage of medical and
passenger information [49]. More recently, an ex-pilot
discussed his view of ACARS usage from the cockpit,
acknowledging the eavesdropping threat and providing
anecdotes of messages being circulated widely amongst
ground networks despite intended for a narrow group of
people [28].
Contributions
Due to the fact that ACARS is used in many ways
by different users, systematically analyzing such data
would require access to a great deal of insider informa-
tion. However, simply providing anecdotal evidence is
not sufficient to illustrate the severity of this problem.
As such, our contributions in this paper are as follows:
– We provide a taxonomy of data link users and dis-
cuss the privacy expectations of each group.
– In order to demonstrate the privacy issues to each
group, we provide evidence from our data collection.
– We demonstrate why the information leaked for
each group is a privacy breach.
– We discuss why such privacy breaches occur, despite
ACARS being known to be an unsecured data link.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows:
Section 2 introduces the threat model that privacy-
conscious actors in aviation face. Section 3 describes the
necessary background on aviation and its main data link
ACARS whilst Section 4 analyzes the existing privacy
provisions available to aviation users. Section 5 presents
our novel framework for aviation privacy comprising
concerned stakeholders and privacy requirements. Sec-
tion 6 discusses our data sources, Section 7 identifies
stakeholder privacy requirements whilst Section 8 eval-
uates how privacy requirements are being breached on
the ACARS data link. This is followed by an analysis
of the implications in Section 9. Finally, Section 10 dis-
cusses the related work before Section 11 concludes.
2 Threat Model
To frame our discussion of the privacy landscape in avi-
ation, we first propose the typical threat to users of
avionic data link systems. We consider our attacker to
be passive with respect to the medium, only ever receiv-
ing messages.
Due to the general lack of security in ACARS the
barrier-to-entry for an attacker is low. We presume
an attacker to be moderately resourced, having access
to standard desktop computers, commodity software-
defined radios (SDRs) and antenna. We further pre-
sume the attacker has a moderate level of technical ca-
pability, i.e. can set up and use the equipment, with
the ability to produce tools to operate the SDR. Given
the range of uses for avionic data link, different attack-
ers are thus likely to have vary in intention. Primarily,
we model an attacker collecting data for either criminal
gain, to achieve competitive advantage or for some kind
of surveillance.
Attackers seeking criminal gain might focus on fi-
nancial or operational data allowing them to steal as-
sets or blackmail victims. Those looking for competitive
advantage might seek to track business aircraft in order
to predict business actions, as alluded to in Section 1.
Threat actors aiming to use data link for surveillance
might simply want to know if an aircraft is in the air,
others might want to acquire more detailed information
about its location and status. Due to the range of possi-
ble intentions of threat actors, we note that an attacker
might deploy sensors in multiple locations or collect in
a mobile fashion.
3 Background
In this section we introduce the key concepts needed to
contextualize the problem of sensitive data leakage from
ACARS. We first explain the aviation scenario before
looking at ACARS and how it is used in detail.
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3.1 Aviation
Airspaces are complicated, safety-critical environments
which rely on quick, accurate communication between
all parties involved. Each country or region has Air
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) which adminis-
ter ATC for a given region. It is their responsibility to
ensure that the aircraft in the airspace have sufficient
separation, to allocate take-off and landing slots, and to
handle any emergency situations which may arise. In or-
der to do this, voice and data communications are used
extensively both on the ground and in the air. Further-
more, aircraft are often part of a fleet of numerous air-
frames. Monitoring these aircraft for information such
as location, estimated arrival times and maintenance
data allows for faster turnarounds and more efficient
operation.
A number of systems are used to manage the
civil airspace with future developments focussing on
data link rather than voice communications. This in-
volves introducing systems such as Automatic Depen-
dent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) for tracking air-
craft [14], making greater use of systems such as Mode
S to provide situational awareness (see [38]) as well
as utilizing existing systems such as ACARS until new
ones are deployed.
Broadly, aviation can be split into flights falling
into—and outside of—the category of general aviation.
This category is defined as all scheduled air services or
non-scheduled air transport operations for renumeration
or hire [19] though this divide is somewhat simplistic
and we expand upon it in Section 5. However, the divide
can still heavily influence the usage of avionic systems.
3.2 Aircraft Communications Addressing
and Reporting System
Originating from the VHF network created in 1978 [27],
ACARS provides an ASCII character-based data link
between aircraft and ground stations; it is defined by
ARINC 724B-6 [3]. Originally specified for Very High
Frequency (VHF), High Frequency (HF) and Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) links were added, allow-
ing worldwide coverage. Typically, VHF is used over
populated land and small bodies of water, SATCOM
extends coverage to oceanic and rural land areas, with
HF providing worldwide coverage. Furthermore, VHF
is offered through older technology known as Plain Old
ACARS (POA) and the newer VHF Data Link mode 2
(VDLm2), which has a higher data rate. A representa-
Fig. 1. Representation of the ACARS sub-systems
Fig. 2. Summarized ACARS message format, identifying the rele-
vant fields for this paper
tion of the ACARS subsystems can be seen in Figure 1.
An aircraft will select one of the three communication
methods based on signal strength—typically, the prior-
ity from high-to-low is VHF, SATCOM and HF.
ACARS messages are mainly composed of a text
field—a summarized version of the message format can
be seen in Figure 2. Routing is achieved via the flight
ID and label, being used by a Communications Manage-
ment Unit (CMU) to send the message to the correct
on-board system. Message content is structured based
on the ARINC 620-8 standard [4]. These messages cover
a wide range of purposes including weather report re-
quests, aircrew free-text messages or time requests. In-
deed, messages of different purposes will be originated
by different parties on board or on the ground.
3.3 Usage of ACARS
Many aircraft systems can originate ACARS messages,
creating a range of types of information sent over the
link. Indeed, many of the services it provides now were
not part of the original intention of the system—ACARS
was initially designed to provide a logging system to
monitor hours worked by crew [27]. It has now evolved
significantly, providing services broadly divided into
air traffic control and airline administrative/operational
control.
ATC messages over ACARS provide safety-critical
services such as negotiating clearances and communicat-
ing weather and aerodrome information. These services
are particularly useful in congested airspace, where voice
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VHF frequencies are often under heavy load. In the case
of negotiating a clearance to fly a particular route, an
aircraft will use a predefined ACARS message exchange
protocol in order make a request, whereas for weather
and aerodrome information, a ground station will reply
with data based on a request from an aircraft. In many
ATC messages, an aircraft will reveal where it is flying
to and sometimes where it currently is.
Airline administrative and operational control is not
confined to airlines but to fleet managing in general. Ex-
amples include transferring flight plans, maintenance in-
formation, loading sheets or free-text crew communica-
tions with ground staff. Similar to ATC messages, flight
plans can contain information about what the aircraft
will do next, whereas many of the other of this category
of message are relating to those onboard. Maintenance
information messages are used to ensure that aircraft is-
sues can be fixed upon landing whilst loading sheets are
used to transfer what quantity of passengers and cargo
are on board so pilots can configure the aircraft’s sys-
tems. Most loosely defined are free-text messages which
has been observed being used for anything from request-
ing aid for a passenger on landing to asking for sports
scores or news updates. Generally, these messages are
not immediately safety critical but instead can contain
sensitive information with respect to the user of the air-
craft.
3.4 Securing ACARS
Although ACARS has no security by default, some se-
curity solutions of varying complexity and effectiveness
have been developed as optional ‘add-ons’. The most
comprehensive systems are based on the ARINC 823P1
standard ACARS Message Security (AMS) [2] and im-
plementations based on this standard such as Secure
ACARS [34]. These provide message confidentiality and
authentication. Cryptography used in Secure ACARS
matches the US National Security Agency’s Commer-
cial National Security Algorithm (CSNA) Suite though
with older Suite B parameters [26], thus is of industry
standard. However, little public work exists on the im-
plementations as they are proprietary. Whilst no official
usage figures have been published, we have not observed
consistent usage of AMS on either SATCOM or VHF
channels.
Other proprietary solutions developed by individ-
ual airlines or manufacturers exist, some of which are
highly insecure (such as monoalphabetic substitution ci-
phers [40]) and unsuitable in providing confidentiality or
authentication. This is used somewhat widely across a
range of stakeholder groups.
4 Protecting Privacy
A number of methods exist to protect privacy for data
used in aviation, though not all are aviation specific.
Furthermore, the ability to use each depends on the type
of stakeholder. This section explains these provisions, as
well as the realities and drawbacks of each.
4.1 Data Protection Legislation
In many parts of the world, data protection legislation
is a key measure in enabling citizens to protect their
privacy. Whilst data protection provisions cannot guar-
antee privacy from the outset, they can at least provide
a legal basis for defending it. This is particularly rele-
vant to the aviation scenario; those on board the aircraft
are unlikely to control how their data is treated, and the
primary method of transferring data is by default not
secured.
As an example, the current European Union (EU)
data protection regulation which requires member states
to implement such legislation in their national laws was
introduced in 1995 [9]. Section 8, Article 17 mandates
the security of data processing. Specifically, the data
controller must ensure “appropriate technical and orga-
nizational” measures are taken to protect against loss,
accidental disclosure and modification. Instances where
inadequate security in conjunction with ACARS causes
sensitive data to be transmitted in cleartext is an ob-
vious breach of this regulation. Unfortunately, this is
a post-hoc solution which protects those affected by
threat of legal action. As such this is powerful but slow-
moving; the level and speed to which it is enforced may
vary within the EU. This is set to become even more
powerful in the coming years as new legislation affect
all those processing data in the member states, as well
as increasing fines to the greater of 4% of company
turnover or e20 million [10].
4.2 Blocking of Public Aircraft Displays
One way non-commercial aircraft can restrict shared
information is through government-level blocking pro-
grams. The most complete and public example is a block
on the Aircraft Situation Display to Industry (ASDI)
data feed, managed by the American Federal Aviation
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Table 1. Business aircraft using ACARS registered in off-shore
financial centers (countries with more than 5 occurrences listed).
OFC Number of registered aircraft
Isle of Man 118
Malta 61
Bermuda 56
Cayman Islands 49
Aruba 22
UAE 17
Hong Kong 6
Administration (FAA) [13]. The FAA allows organiza-
tions to subscribe to the ASDI feed, though obtaining
access to this feed is not easily feasible.
Aircraft owners can apply to the FAA to have their
information removed from the ASDI feed. The most
stringent block is at the FAA level, where flight infor-
mation relating to a specific aircraft is removed before it
is disseminated as part of the ASDI feed. Data can also
be blocked at the subscriber level, who are then con-
tractually obliged to not make information on blocked
aircraft public. However, some information, usually ex-
istence, is available via flight trackers for an subscriber
level block.
Until June 2011, obtaining such a block required an
aircraft owner to demonstrate a ‘valid security concern’,
which amounts to a threat against a person, organiza-
tion or the aircraft traveling to a location known to have
a terrorist threat [11]. From this we can determine that
those who used an ASDI block at this time had a defi-
nite, FAA approved cause for privacy. However the FAA
relaxed this in December 2011 [12], now allowing any
non-commercial aircraft to request a block [13]. Even
though a security concern is no longer required, request-
ing a block on an aircraft is still a definite attempt to
achieve privacy. As such, we consider anything which
undermines such a block to be a privacy breach.
4.3 Obscuring of Public Registers
Similarly to blocking of flight data, some stakeholders
use third-party entities to register their aircraft to con-
ceal the real owner from public records. Popular meth-
ods include the use of shell companies (often off-shore),
special aircraft registration services, wealth manage-
ment companies and trusts. We found over 12,000 air-
craft registered by trusts and specialised services in the
FAA records, accounting for over 3.75% of all aircraft
registrations in the US. Another 53,000 or 16.5% are reg-
istered to Limited Liability Companies (LLC), many of
which follow the naming scheme NXXXXX LLC, where
the so-called N number is the registration of the aircraft.
While careful mining of public records may unearth the
real operators of these aircraft, the popularity of this
type of public record obfuscation shows the importance
of privacy provisions.
Furthermore, 353 of the business aircraft in our col-
lected ACARS data were registered to shell companies
in recognized off-shore financial centers, with the most
popular being the Isle of Man, Malta, Bermuda and the
Cayman Islands (see Table 1).1 This means that more
than 20% of the business jets seen in our collection area
in Central Europe are registered in such off-shore cen-
ters.
4.4 Use of ACARS Security Mechanisms
As described in Section 3.4, the standardized approach
to security in ACARS is AMS. This is the most direct
way of protecting many aspects of privacy when using
ACARS as it leaves very little of the message content
in the clear. It should be noted that whilst other secu-
rity solutions do exist, such as the substitution cipher
described in [40], they are of extremely variable quality
and thus cannot be considered to protect privacy.
4.5 Radio Silence
Arguably the most drastic option, radio silence involves
an aircraft opting to not use an avionic technology such
as ACARS. In some instances, this is the ability to
turn the system on and off at will; e.g., military air-
craft are permitted to turn ADS-B off for operational
purposes [18]. While this protects privacy by greatly re-
ducing information leakage, it severely degrades service.
For ACARS this degradation is mostly operational and
will cause inconvenience to ATC, aircraft operators and
crew.
5 Aviation Privacy Framework
In order to assess where privacy breaches occur, we pro-
pose a framework for privacy for the aviation scenario.
We first introduce our taxonomy of four fundamental
privacy concepts that are important in aviation. Sec-
1 We apply the definition of ‘off-shore’ used by Rose and
Spiegel [31].
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ondly, we describe the relevant stakeholder categories,
which are responsible for most of the data link usage in
aviation.
5.1 Privacy Concepts
To understand potential privacy breaches, we define four
categories of aviation privacy: existence, intention, sta-
tus, and passenger/cargo information. A given message
may fit into multiple categories. Indeed, not all aircraft
will transmit in each category and not all stakeholders
will consider each to be sensitive.
5.1.1 Existence
The most basic concept of aviation privacy is existence,
i.e., information relating to a particular aircraft’s tem-
poral and spacial whereabouts. Consequently, a breach
of this concept requires the combination of both, knowl-
edge about the operator or user of a given aircraft and
acquisition of data on the aircraft’s transmissions.
Preserving the privacy of existence is difficult as air-
craft are required to be part of mostly public records and
are easily spotted with the naked eye at airports and in
the air. However, their use of a multitude of public com-
munication channels during flight makes the breach of
this concept automatically exploitable and most impor-
tantly scalable.
5.1.2 Intention
Determining an aircraft’s origin and destination is less
trivial than visually spotting it at airports. For commer-
cial aviation, details of their routes are required to be
public (see [11]) but for all others, it is understandable
why they might wish to hide their flight route. Receiv-
ing very few messages can fully reveal an aircraft’s in-
tentions. As an aircraft, e.g., negotiates ATC clearance
it typically includes destination and route revealing not
only where an aircraft is travelling, but also which path
it takes.
Similarly, communication revealing only the desti-
nation airport breaches intention privacy. Even when an
aircraft operator avoids requesting airport clearance via
ACARS, other seemingly innocent messages leak inten-
tion. An example are weather reports needed to safely
navigate the airspace: an aircraft requesting weather in-
formation for an aeronautical waypoint or airport will
be highly likely to visit the location it enquired about.
5.1.3 Status
Since ACARS is used to report to operations and ad-
ministrations teams, it can reveal a wide range of ad-
ditional data relating to on board happenings beyond
other surveillance mechanisms, such as the maintenance
state of the aircraft and what it is doing right now.
Status information can be revealed through system-
atic means, such as situational reporting. This includes
position, altitude and speed, thus resulting in varying
sensitivity for different stakeholder groups. Those which
value intention and existence privacy are also likely to
value protecting status. However, a significant portion of
status messages are of a less predictable format. For ex-
ample, if the cause of some fuel reports, maintenance re-
quests and logbook entries caused an unexpected change
in flight plan, this could contribute to a leak of sensitive
status information.
5.1.4 Passenger/Cargo Information
For the concepts described above, most messages follow
a regular structure and transmission pattern. In con-
trast, passenger and cargo information is found within
free-text messages used by crew to connect with their
airline operations centers. Communicating with the
ground is operationally useful, e.g. when sending ad-
vance lists of passengers on a layover. However, when
transferring such data in the clear, there are potential
legal, ethical and financial implications. This informa-
tion is inherently sensitive; at the most basic level, it
ties passengers or aircraft contents to a specific depar-
ture and arrival airport. In more extreme cases, data
such as medical condition or payment details could fall
under this category. Indeed, passengers and cargo own-
ers do not have agency over any data sent in this way.
As most relevant content is transmitted in unstruc-
tured free-text messages, the concrete privacy issues un-
der this concept vary significantly from airline to airline.
5.2 Aviation Stakeholders
The aviation scenario has a diverse set of stakeholders.
In this section, we categorize these stakeholders along
their respective objectives and needs, followed by an
analysis of their privacy requirements.
We build our categories based on the ICAO clas-
sification of civil aviation, which divides the group
into commercial air transport and general aviation [19].
Commercial air transport is defined as “an aircraft op-
eration involving the transport of passengers, cargo or
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mail for remuneration or hire”, with general aviation
comprising all civil aviation outside of this definition.
As such, state, business and non-operational military
aviation fall under the general aviation category if the
flights are not on hired aircraft and they are not on mil-
itary missions. Table 2 illustrates the breakdown of the
different stakeholder types, on which we will elaborate
in this section.
5.2.1 Business
Business stakeholders typically fly jets capable of 4–
20 passengers. Gulfstream’s G-range, Cessna’s Citation
jets and Bombardier’s Learjet and Challenger aircraft
are amongst the most popular choices. There are also
business airliners based on commercial airframes pro-
duced by Boeing and Airbus, which in their VIP and
corporate versions constitute the high-end of the mar-
ket and are capable of carrying 100 passengers or more.
According to ICAO definitions, business flights can ei-
ther be commercial on-demand services (in the case of
chartering an aircraft through a hire company) or, if the
aircraft is owned by the operator and used without hire,
can be counted under general aviation. They are used
to transport business personnel to meetings, conferences
or other gatherings and as such the place to which they
travel can reveal a lot about the intentions of those on
board.
5.2.2 Commercial
A significant part of aviation is composed of commercial
air transport, which we define as non-business commer-
cial air transport. This can be a chartered or scheduled
flight carrying passengers, cargo or mail. Usually these
are large aircraft built by Airbus or Boeing, carrying
hundreds of passengers or significant amounts of cargo.
Passenger aircraft will often carry some cargo in the
hold, cargo aircraft, on the other hand, do not tend to
carry passengers.
Commercial aircraft heavily use data link for ATC
in congested airspace and fleet management, with the
exact usage varying depending on the operator. It ap-
pears a significant portion of this communication is au-
tomated.
5.2.3 Military
We classify any aircraft operated by a national airforce
as military aircraft. Flying many types of aircraft, mili-
tary stakeholders operate in a very different way to com-
mercial aircraft. A typically military fleet will consist of
some civilian aircraft adapted for military purpose or
used for transport, and a set of military-specific air-
craft. These aircraft are able to operate in ways civilian
aircraft cannot; they can use military-specific commu-
nications systems and have the ability to turn off some
systems such as ADS-B. Military aircraft types that use
ACARS range from modified airliners over small busi-
ness jets to tankers and multi-role transport aircraft,
but not fighter jets.
5.2.4 State
Aircraft used by state officials, members of governments
or heads of state form a section of aviation which dif-
fers from country to country. In some states, officials are
transported by the flag-carrier airline, in others this task
falls to the military, and many heads of state also have
their own private aircraft. For example in the United
Kingdom, the Royal Family and government use state-
owned, military-operated aircraft [5]. Regardless of the
operator, these aircraft are usually of a similar type to
business aircraft; from small Gulfstream, Embraer and
Bombardier jets to larger Airbus or Boeing jets for big-
ger delegations. They tend to operate in similar ways to
civilian aircraft even if they are operated by the mili-
tary.
5.2.5 Hobbyists
Hobbyist aviators represent the most heterogeneous
group of pilots, users and aircraft. These aircraft usu-
ally operate in a visual, rather than instrument based
manner meaning that flights are shorter and weather
dependent. Pilot skill is likely to vary more since fewer
are professionals, thus the number of flying hours signif-
icantly differ. This category includes gliders, light air-
craft flown for pleasure or stunt aircraft. They are able
to carry under five passengers and are not commonly
used to transport said passengers from place to place.
Because of the limited instrumentation, this group of
aircraft does not tend to use ACARS thus we do not
consider them further.
6 Data Sources and Collection
In order to assess the privacy breaches according to this
framework, we collected ACARS data for nine months.
We describe our data sources and collection approach,
as well as our ethical and legal considerations
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For a long time after conception, ACARS required
specialist hardware to decode thus placing it out of reach
to all but a determined attacker. Recently, software-
defined radios such as the RTL-SDR have become avail-
able for as little as $10, spurring the development of
software enabling the decoding of previously difficult to
access communications. A number of tools exist to de-
code ACARS, many of which are free.
As described in Section 2, we presume an attacker
is moderately resourced and skilled in using SDRs and
receiving signals. We focus on VHF and SATCOM, due
to the much increased difficulties and space required to
install an HF antenna. A typical VHF setup is straight-
forward, simply requiring an airband antenna usually
available for $50-100, fed into an RTL-SDR running
ACARSDec [24]. We collected for 242 days on the three
European channels: 131.525 MHz, 131.725 MHz and
131.850 MHz. Note that we solely collect on Plain Old
ACARS channels since currently, there are no publicly
available tools to gather VDLm2 messages.
SATCOM uplink is located in the L-band around
1.5 GHz; reception uses a patch antenna costing $80,
fed into an RTL-SDR running JAERO.2 We recorded
all eleven uplink channels of INMARSAT satellite 3F2
for 67 days. SATCOM downlink and HF require larger
investments in antenna because of low transmission
power. The former, located in the C-band around
3.5 GHz, has much shorter wavelengths than the up-
link and greater path loss. On the other hand HF has
much larger wavelengths thus requiring large antennas
for optimal reception.
Due to the nature of transmission over VHF and
SATCOM receive one direction of communication. For
VHF, we primarily receive downlink of overhead air-
craft as also receiving uplink would require line-of-sight
to the ground transmitter. In the case of SATCOM, up-
link messages are a higher power and lower wavelength
due to aircraft having limited receiver space. This is
easy to intercept as the beam area is large. Ground sta-
tions receiving downlink can use bigger receivers than
aircraft, allowing satellites to transmit at higher wave-
length thus having a smaller beam and making it much
more difficult for third parties to intercept.
Over the course of collection, we obtained 1,651,941
messages across both links, with 1,228,452 (74.4%) be-
ing from SATCOM uplink and the remaining 423,489
(25.6%) being VHF. On the SATCOM link this con-
sisted of 4537 aircraft, and 6190 on VHF with 1797 of
2 https://github.com/jontio/JAERO
Table 2. Breakdown by stakeholder of identifiable aircraft using
the ACARS data link.
Stakeholder type Number of aircraft (% total aircraft)
Private/business 1,701 (19.06%)
Commercial 6,645 (74.44%)
Military 438 (4.90%)
State-related 143 (1.60%)
All 8,927 (100%)
these appearing on both. In Table 2 we show the number
of aircraft belonging to each stakeholder group. Clearly,
commercial aircraft make up the majority of all ACARS
users with 74.44%, with those qualifying as business jets
comprising the other significant portion at 19.06%. Mil-
itary and state-based aircraft were observed to be much
smaller at 4.91% and 1.60% respectively—unsurprising
considering the exclusivity of these groups.
6.1 Aircraft Metadata Sources
There are several public data sources which provide
meta-information on aircraft based on their identifiers:
the aircraft registration or a unique 24 bit address pro-
vided by ICAO. This information typically includes the
aircraft type (e.g., Airbus A320) and the owner/opera-
tor (e.g., British Airways), which can be exploited for
further in-depth analysis and stakeholder identification.
We use several public database provided by third par-
ties for our analysis of the aircraft metadata of ACARS
users, typically in SQLite or CSV format:
– The first database is available and constantly up-
dated in the Planeplotter software [6]. Our version
of the database is from October 2016, containing
147,084 rows of aircraft data.
– The second database is available from Junzi Sun
at TU Delft, who has been collecting information
on all visible aircraft from a public flight tracker
over a period of 18 months at the time of writing,
amounting to 116,338 rows [44].
– The not-for-profit project Airframes.org is the most
valuable online source for learning general aircraft
information as it offers comprehensive data, includ-
ing background knowledge such as pictures and his-
torical ownership information [22].
– Lastly, for aircraft registered in the USA, the FAA
provides a daily updated database of all owner
records, online and for download. These naturally
exclude any sensitive owner information but overall
contain 320,777 records at the time of writing [15].
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More ACARS focussed, AVDelphi provides logs of
ACARS messages for aircraft [7]. This allows for check-
ing of aircraft when they travel outside of our collection
range.
Note that these sources are naturally noisy, since
they rely on compiling many separate smaller databases
and aircraft around the world are registered, de-
registered and transferred regularly. However, in their
combination they provide a very accurate picture of the
general characteristics of the aviation environment.
6.2 Legal and Ethical Considerations
Since we were aware that the likelihood of collecting
sensitive data was high we upheld strong ethical con-
duct throughout the work. At all times data access was
restricted and not disseminated in full form. Indeed, we
have made great efforts to anonymize data presented in
this paper such that the privacy breach cannot be ex-
ploited through our work. We ensured that all relevant
laws and regulations were adhered to, and informed or-
ganizations who were leaking particularly sensitive in-
formation such as financial or medical data.
7 Privacy Expectations of
Stakeholders
In this section we apply the concept of privacy expecta-
tions to the different stakeholder groups. We summarize
the respective privacy requirements in Table 3 alongside
the breaches, which are detailed in Section 8.
For each requirement we rank it as none, low or
high. A high privacy expectation is critical to the
stakeholder—for example, a breach might cause finan-
cial loss or personal harm. We class low expectations
as those which would be beneficial but are not plac-
ing stakeholders at risk; an example could be something
which might cause inconvenience but no harm like leak-
ing a telephone number. None means that the informa-
tion is necessarily being public.
In general, we base our assessment of a stakeholder’s
privacy requirements on the following sources:
– Public statements: Certain privacy requirements
can be inferred directly from statements made pub-
3 Assuming this is an operational flight, i.e. not training or
similar.
licly by the affected stakeholders.
– Blocking of flight data: As explained in Sec-
tion 4.2, schemes exist allowing stakeholders to
restrict the dissemination of status, intent and ex-
istence information. Should an aircraft utilize this,
we can determine that they are privacy sensitive;
depending on the level of block they use, they may
be sensitive to exposure of all types of informa-
tion. We use the numbers provided in Table 4 to
infer such requirements for the four different groups.
– Obscuring of public registers: Similarly to the
blocking of flight data, privacy requirements (in par-
ticular existence) can be derived from stakeholders
who use third-party entities to register their aircraft
in order to conceal the real owner (see Section 4.3).
7.1 Business
As can be inferred from Table 4 the majority, at
over 95%, of international business aircraft are part of
schemes that block the public display of their flight
data. This illustrates the overwhelming wish for protec-
tion of the intent and status of this user group. Indeed,
the predecessor of the FAA ASDI scheme was originally
created for business aircraft and regular statements of
corresponding lobby groups on thus topic underline the
severity of this privacy requirement [23, 25, 48].
Information about passengers on board business jets
may be sensitive, too, and can in the case of non-hired
jets typically be inferred from its owner or operator.
Indeed, while the owners and operators of most air-
craft globally are easily accessible in various official
databases, this is not true for all jets in the business
category. As discussed in Section 4.3, many individu-
als and corporate owners register their aircraft under
other names. Instead they use hard-to-track shell com-
panies registered overseas, or specialized services offered
by trust and wealth management companies, which act
as the owner or operator, illustrating a heightened need
for privacy of passenger information in this category.
In some cases, these tactics may also be used in an at-
tempt to hide the existence of a specific aircraft as far
as it relates to a particular owner [25].
7.2 Commercial
Typically, commercial aircraft have no provision to hide
data on their existence, intention or status. This is
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Table 3. Comparison of privacy requirements against whether they have been breached in ACARS usage. ‘N’ is no breach, ‘V’ is evi-
dence of a breach and ‘X’ is an explicit breach.
Existence Intention Status Passenger/Cargo
Required Breached Required Breached Required Breached Required Breached
Business Low X High X High X High V
Commercial None N/A None N/A None N/A High X
Military High3 X High X High X High V
State Low X High X High X High V
Table 4. Breakdown of blocked aircraft by stakeholder. Percent-
ages are of total aircraft in that stakeholder group.
Stakeholder type Number of blocked aircraft
(% aircraft for group)
Private/business 1,617 (95.06%)
Commercial 171 (2.57%)
Military 418 (95.43%)
State-related 81 (56.64%)
All 2,287 (25.62%)
partly illustrated by the fact that their records are pub-
lic and typically no capability for blocks exist (apart
from very few exceptions, see Table 4). However, as al-
luded to by [34], status messages containing content re-
lating to cargo or operational details can pose a privacy
challenge for commercial aircraft.
Furthermore, for commercial aircraft carrying
passengers there are legal—and arguably ethical—
requirements to ensure that any sensitive passenger data
is treated in accordance with data protection legisla-
tion covered in Section 4.1. As such we class this type
of information to have a high privacy requirement for
commercial aircraft.
7.3 Military
Military stakeholders have a strict privacy requirement
in order to carry out operations effectively. Indeed, the
original conception and development of Secure ACARS
stems from a military requirement to use ACARS, which
due to the lack of security as standard was considered
unsuitable for military traffic [33], illustrating the high
military requirement for privacy.
Air forces, through their close government relations,
are able to use all avenues to protect their privacy. For
example, aircraft of the US Air Force are excluded from
all public FAA records illustrating the intent to hide
their existence.4 On top of this, military aircraft typ-
ically request to have their flight information blocked
from public feeds; we observed that more than 95% of
all military ACARS users apply such blocks (see Ta-
ble 4). This demonstrates a high requirement to hide
not only existence, but also status and intention, thus
concealing sensitive information which may reveal oper-
ational movements.
As far as military aircraft are used to transfer mili-
tary or government leaders, their passenger information
may also be considered highly sensitive. The same ap-
plies for the identity and personal information of any
passenger in an aircraft operated by the military as
stated for example by the US Air Force [1, 33].
7.4 State
As military-operated aircraft prove to be one common
approach for this category, we consider them to have a
similar set of privacy requirements. Many state aircraft
are blocked from public feeds and also considered of sen-
sitive nature in public aircraft records. A related non-
military example would be surveillance aircraft used by
the FBI, which are registered to a number of front com-
panies and excluded from the FAA records [43].
Some requirements may differ, however. Depending
on the operating country, existence and intention are po-
tentially less sensitive since many state movements are
publicly announced and government aircraft are part of
all official records. In other countries, state and gov-
ernment aircraft have been involved in several scandals
with regards to their movements and sometimes simply
the very nature of their existence [20]. These differing
approaches are reflected in Table 4, where only slightly
more than half of all state and government aircraft are
blocked from public display. In any case, due to the
high-profile nature of those on board, passenger infor-
4 Some countries’ air forces, such as Switzerland with the Swiss
Aircraft Register, do publish all aircraft records in full [16].
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mation relating to these aircraft is likely to be extremely
sensitive.
8 Privacy Breaches
With stakeholders matched to privacy expectations, we
use this section to demonstrate that ACARS is a vehi-
cle for systematic leakage of sensitive data. Due to the
fact that we only observe part of the bidirectional link
for both SATCOM and VHF we define breaches as ‘no
evidence’, ‘evidence’ and ‘explicit’. Evidence of a breach
is where messages are seen on an observed link which
would incite a leak on the other part of the link—for
example, requesting personal information of a passen-
ger. An explicit breach is where we observe instances of
sensitive information being leaked on the observed link.
We summarize the results of this section along with the
privacy requirements defined in Section 7 in Table 3,
noting that for all cases, our observed links either pro-
vided evidence of leaks or more commonly, explicitly
leaked sensitive information.
8.1 Business
Even with business leaders indicating significant pri-
vacy requirements, this category of aircraft leaks a vast
amount of information. More specifically, every pri-
vacy requirement is compromised in the course of using
ACARS, either due to it being in the clear or by using
weak attempts at encryption. We summarize the pri-
vacy breaches discussed in this section through Table 5
for VHF and Table 6 for SATCOM.
Although a ‘low’ requirement, a cursory survey of
US-registered aircraft observed allowed us to breach the
existence requirement by looking them up via public
FAA registers as described in Section 4.3. On the VHF
we saw 750 blocked aircraft (of 1002 observed, 75.0%)
registered to shell companies, with SATCOM seeing 615
(of 881, 70.0%). We do believe that with further manual
work, details on the obscured business aircraft can be
obtained.
Primarily on the VHF link, some business aircraft
transmit positional reports, with some containing more
than just position alone. At the very least, they contra-
vene the status privacy requirement. We observed that
541 (51.3%) aircraft transmit positional reports, with
522 (49.5% of all, 96.5% of position reporting aircraft)
having ASDI blocks. Indeed, 3689 (95.6% of position
Table 5. Summary of privacy breaching VHF ACARS usage by
business aircraft (A/C). Percentages are of total number of busi-
ness aircraft and messages from business aircraft respectively.
Aircraft Blocked
A/C
Messages Msg. from
Blocked A/C
Position
Reports
541
(51.3%)
522
(49.5%)
3,859
(33.0%)
3,689
(31.5%)
Clearance/
ATIS
168
(15.9%)
159
(15.1%)
1,055
(9.0%)
431 (3.7%)
Encrypted
Messages
47
(4.5%)
47
(4.5%)
843
(7.2%)
843 (7.2%)
Table 6. Summary of privacy breaching SATCOM ACARS usage
by business aircraft (A/C). Percentages are of total number of
business aircraft and messages from business aircraft respectively.
Aircraft Blocked
A/C
Messages Msg. from
Blocked A/C
Clearance 38
(4.1%)
38
(4.1%)
72
(0.3%)
72 (0.3%)
ATIS 185
(19.7%)
172
(18.3%)
693
(3.2%)
655 (3.0%)
Encrypted
Messages
131
(13.8%)
124
(13.2%)
1,703
(7.9%)
1,598 (7.4%)
reporting) messages came from blocked aircraft, under-
mining their effort to block their actions.
Business aircraft regularly reveal intention by par-
taking in ATC clearance exchanges via ACARS. The
ability to receive full intention information relies on ge-
ographical position—if a receiver is near to an ATC cen-
ter they will receive destinations and routes. Whilst our
collection location was not located in such a position, we
could instead observe other parts of clearance exchanges
indicating that business aircraft did use this approach.
Additionally, aircraft can request information from the
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) which
announces information relevant to arrival or departure
at an aerodrome. Since an aircraft has to request this
under the ACARS label ‘B9’ (see [4] for further details)
it is done with purpose and reveals the destination aero-
drome of the aircraft thus revealing intention data.
On the VHF link, we observed 168 (15.9% of all) air-
craft involved in clearance or ATIS exchanges with 159
(15.1%) having ASDI blocks. These aircraft transmitted
1055 messages, with 431 (40.9%) being from blocked air-
craft in doing so counteracting their privacy efforts. On
the SATCOM link, fewer clearance messages exist—only
70 messages from 38 aircraft, all of which are blocked.
However, 185 (19.7%) aircraft use ATIS over this link,
172 (18.3%) of which are blocked. These aircraft trans-
mitted 693 messages of this type, 655 (94.5%) of which
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Fig. 3. Labelled plaintext message format of encrypted positional
reports, from [40].
(2AAFB12-JAN-17 14: 55Z) subjet:
EMAIL FROM: DISPATCH AT [REDACTED].COM
HELLO. BROKERS SAY PAX WAS PICKED UP in central
Copenhagen
Fig. 4. Extract from a free-text SATCOM message, discussion
where the passenger has been collected from
were from blocked aircraft thus revealing their destina-
tion aircraft. Clearly a significant amount of intention
information is revealed thus is an explicit breach.
As explained in Section 4.4, attempts at using en-
cryption to protect intention and status by some types
of business aircraft fail on account of the cryptography
being weak. An example position report, which as de-
scribed in [40] accounted for approximately a third of
messages across VHF and SATCOM, is shown in Fig-
ure 3. We observed that all 47 aircraft transmitting 843
encrypted messages on VHF were ASDI blocked. On
SATCOM, 131 (13.8%) aircraft transmitted encrypted
messages, with 124 (13.2%) being blocked—the latter
group accounted for 1,598 (93.8%) of the encrypted mes-
sages over this link.
As with commercial aircraft passenger information
is much more anecdotal due to much of it being trans-
ferred in the free-text format, however here we did not
observe any significant explicit breaches, instead evi-
dence of breaches on the other half of the link. SATCOM
is used to transfer emails, revealing 47 email addresses—
some to aviation businesses, though some to Hotmail
and Yahoo addresses. It is worth noting that these mes-
sages are simply uplink so do not always contain email
content—collecting downlink would provide more email
body data. From the email bodies available, we can dis-
cern that these aircraft are transmitting passenger in-
formation over plaintext links. For example, from one
blocked aircraft with unobscured registration details,
we observed the message content as shown in Figure 4
(translated after collection). This indicates part of a dis-
cussion about a passenger location thus provides evi-
dence of a breach.
8.2 Commercial
As indicated in Table 3, commercial aircraft are con-
sidered to have the lowest privacy requirements of all
stakeholder groups since a lot of information relating
to their flights is made public. However, the leaks from
this type of aircraft are arguably the most significant
and explicit, especially for passengers.
Most directly impacting is the transmission of credit
card details, observed in use by two airlines. Whilst not
extremely common, this occurs with sufficient regularity
and message structure to indicate that this is part of
crew procedure. We saw three levels of detail on these
transmissions, from most to least sensitive:
– Full details, including a credit card number, CVV
number, expiry date, amount and sometimes name.
– Partial details, including a partial credit card num-
ber, authorization code or less sensitive details such
as expiry date or amount.
– Transactional context, such as whether a given
transaction (per authorization code) has been au-
thorized, denied, or otherwise.
Since SATCOM collection focussed on uplink messages,
most were relating to authorization with some refer-
ences to value. VHF, however, contained six full sets of
credit card details with five providing transaction val-
ues; for each, the value was over $500. Both SATCOM
and VHF contained partial details, three and four sets
respectively, and SATCOM carried 11 context messages.
This is a significant breach which not only contravenes
data protection legislation but also Requirement 4 of the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-
DSS) [29]. This requirement handles the transmission of
data over networks to which a malicious user can easily
gain access, which is the case with ACARS. Breaching
these regulations can see an organization have its ability
to handle card payments withdrawn.
Free text messages are regularly used to allow crew
and ground bases to communicate about passenger is-
sues, often transmitting passenger information, leaking
it due to the clear text nature of ACARS. During collec-
tion we received 2811 messages relating to passengers.
ACARS lends itself to fast communication ahead
to destination airports so is used to deal with medi-
cal emergencies. On SATCOM uplink, ground stations
would often ask for details on unwell passengers pro-
viding evidence of downlink breaches. Over both links
we observed 28 messages containing medical informa-
tion. Within this, we observed nine instances each of
messages containing passenger names and further med-
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Fig. 5. Plotted flight tracks for all flight plans received for mili-
tary aircraft. Colours were assigned randomly and do not reflect
multiple flight from the same aircraft.
ical information such as condition details, with 21 in-
stances of medical context (i.e. non-medical data or
names relating to an emergency, for example seat num-
bers or medics waiting on landing), providing evidence
of breaches on the other part of the link. Clearly, in the
instances where passenger name and medical informa-
tion are transmitted via ACARS, data protection legis-
lation is clearly breached.
In order to inform passengers ahead of landing
about onwards journeys, some crew contact airline oper-
ations centers to request connecting flight status. How-
ever, some airlines transmit passenger names and on-
ward destinations as part of this. We observed 30 mes-
sages transmitted on SATCOM containing 236 passen-
ger names. Of these, 15 were from one airline which,
from three aircraft leaked 210 passenger names, seat
numbers and corresponding connection details. It ap-
pears that for this airline, any passenger with a connec-
tion will have their data transmitted. In the case of the
less serious breaches (i.e. the remaining 15 messages), 26
passenger names were transmitted and for 18 of these
passengers, an onward destination was also observed.
Whilst this type of breach is not as serious as the
cases above, it does reveal a lot of information about
passenger movements thus is an explicit privacy breach.
It is worth noting that the German airline Lufthansa
transmitted 250 messages apparently related to connec-
tion information over VHF and SATCOM; all of these
messages were encrypted, demonstrating that they con-
sider it sufficiently important information to be worth
protecting.
8.3 Military
The number of military aircraft observed is typically
lower than the other categories. A summary of the most
Table 7. Military aircraft and messages leaking existence and
intention information. Percentages are of all aircraft/messages
from the same category vulnerable to privacy breaches. Message
percentages calculated over all, including non-ACARS messages,
for existence and of ACARS-only messages for other categories.
Leak type Number of aircraft
(% of aircraft)
Number of messages
(% of messages)
Existence 53 (12.5%) 120,100 (82.8%)
Flight Plans 287 (67.9%) 1,260 (5.1%)
Clearance & ATIS 114 (27.0%) 485 (1.9%)
Weather 227 (53.7%) 1,792 (7.2%)
important numbers can be found in Table 7. On the
VHF link, less than one percent of all observed aircraft
could be categorised as belonging to military forces,
compared to slightly more than 9% on the satellite link.
Of those seen via satellite link, 12.5% did not receive any
ACARS messages but only non-ACARS data, such as
network management information. This leaks existence
even with no active communication over ACARS. Fur-
thermore, the vast majority (95%) of military aircraft
seen use ASDI blocks thus have their existence privacy
requirement breached.
Over our collection phase, we received over 1000
flight plans being transmitted to more than 250 mili-
tary aircraft over the satellite link. We were able to re-
construct the flight path for most of them, as shown in
Figure 5. This breaches the intention requirement con-
siderably. We also received close to 1800 weather reports
sent to crew of more than 200 military aircraft. While
not leaking the exact route, these messages specify de-
parture and arrival airports and sometimes navigation
waypoints.
During one and a half months of satellite link collec-
tion we spotted a handful of messages of a military air-
craft fleet commonly used to transport the head of state
of a western government. These messages breached pri-
vacy in various ways. First of all, we received flight plans
which we were able to verify using the OpenSky Net-
work’s (described in [37]) ability to receive both Mode
S and ADS-B transmissions, when the aircraft crossed
the reception range of the sensor network. Additionally,
we received status messages indicating passenger occu-
pancy of a ‘state room’ and number of senior staff and
general passengers on board. Amongst the received data
were cargo lists, indicating presence and absence of ob-
jects called white elephant and grey ghost. As such this
indicates the existence of a breach of passenger infor-
mation but not necessarily an explicit breach, due the
the limited detail of the data transmitted.
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Table 8. State aircraft and messages leaking existence and inten-
tion information. Percentages are of all aircraft/messages from
the same category vulnerable to privacy breaches. Message per-
centages calculated over all, including non-ACARS messages, for
existence and of ACARS-only messages for other categories.
Leak type Number of aircraft
(% of aircraft)
Number of messages
(% of messages)
Existence 46 (31.8%) 16,026 (84.8%)
Flight Plans 6 ( 5.5%) 19 (0.7%)
Clearance & ATIS 22 (20.0%) 108 (3.8%)
Weather 31 (28.2%) 234 (8.2%)
Military aircraft have the ability to turn ADS-B off
in order to provide privacy for existence—the only cat-
egory of aircraft in our framework which have a defi-
nite need to hide the fact that they are in the air. It
is not enough to simply turn off ADS-B reporting in
order to hide ones existence, however. From our data,
we were able to reconstruct that 21% and 48% of mili-
tary aircraft transmitting over satellite and VHF, were
not leaking more than their existence, while 79% and
52% were leaking information for at least in one of the
remaining privacy categories highlighted in Table 3.
8.4 State
Governmental and state aircraft form the smallest pro-
portion of our data, at 1.6% of received messages. How-
ever, SATCOM proved adept in receiving these mes-
sages, with state and military aircraft combined com-
prising over 10% of aircraft seen, due to its global reach.
While existence is only classified as a ‘low’ require-
ment in general for this stakeholder group, individual
flight missions might still require the possibility to use
radio silence. A total of 42% of all state and government
aircraft were receiving satellite communication, however
they did not receive any ACARS messages. Over one
third of all governmental aircraft could therefore poten-
tially gain privacy by not communicating over the satel-
lite link as shown in Table 8. We can see that ACARS
also breaches existence privacy for the 56% of state air-
craft using ASDI blocks through their use of the system.
Aircraft used on behalf of one government regularly
transmitted positional claims over the course of the col-
lection period; for one of these aircraft, Figure 6 displays
plotted reports joined up into tracks where messages
were sent in over a short time period. Note that this air-
craft has no flights available to view on Flightradar24,
thus by transmitting these reports over ACARS, they
Fig. 6. Plotted location reports from a government aircraft trans-
mitting positional reports. Where there were multiple position re-
ports in a short time period, these are joined together as a track.
are explicitly breaching privacy and undermining other
efforts.
Another aircraft from a European government’s
fleet regularly received ACARS messages over satellite
link indicating that data link position reporting had
been turned off. Looking up this aircraft on AvDelphi in-
dicated that position reports were received nearly every
day with the exception of days where ‘position report-
ing turned off’ messages had been received via satellite.
The same aircraft was also seen transmitting position
reports on VHF when it passed through our reception
range.
We found communication directly related to state
aircraft intention in either clearance and ATIS messages
or in weather reports. As Table 8 shows, one fifth of all
government related aircraft received clearance and ATIS
messages containing destination airport codes. Slightly
more than 25% of those receiving weather reports were
also leaking the destination airport. We received a small
number of weak encrypted messages as outlined in Sec-
tion 4.4, used by business jets. These messages con-
tained weather reports leaking departure and destina-
tion airports thus adding to the breach of intention in-
formation.
A small number of governmental aircraft were also
observed transmitting clear text e-mail messages via the
ACARS satellite link. The nature of these messages was
mainly flight status related, however, additionally leak-
ing names and e-mail addresses belonging to fleet oper-
ator or government employees. However since email ad-
dress are of limited sensitivity and we saw no evidence
of further passenger data, we do class this as evidence
of breach of passenger information requirement rather
than an explicit breach.
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9 Implications of Breaches
Clearly, the ACARS data link in its current form poses
a significant privacy challenge; leaks are widespread
and consistent enough to constitute a serious and long-
running issue. In this section, we discuss the key implica-
tions of the observed privacy breaches and provide rec-
ommendations to prevent or reduce further data leak-
age.
As we have shown, many aviation stakeholders al-
ready go to great lengths to protect their respective pri-
vacy interests but are regularly undermined by their use
of ACARS. Indeed, for each group, we have observed
leaks with the potential to cause serious harm, either
politically, reputationally, economically or otherwise.
For example, breaches relating to passenger infor-
mation put the ACARS user at risk of financial and
reputational loss, by breaking relevant data protec-
tion laws. Overall, we note a major lack of awareness
and complacency around the modern use of ACARS
as a data link. While some individuals within aviation
have warned against its imprudent and thoughtless use
[46, 49], most ACARS users seem to be either unaware
of its security problems or use it all the same.
Mitigation and Countermeasures
Many of the leaks described in Section 8 are as a result
of the message content; without it, the most a single
receiver can determine is the aircraft existence. Thus,
protecting message content is the most effective way to
address leaks. There are two ways of achieving this with
ACARS deployed as it currently is: educate users to
avoid transferring sensitive data via ACARS, or deploy
an ACARS Message Security solution to all relevant air-
craft.
Deploying AMS would be the most complete and
effective countermeasure, as it can provide message au-
thentication, confidentiality and integrity. This would
effectively solve the issue of leaks to a passive observer
but does come with challenges. As with any distributed
security solution, implementing a public-key infrastruc-
ture is costly and requires thoughtful, security-conscious
design. Especially in the case of aircraft, which must
be able to communicate with unexpected ground sta-
tions, keeping up-to-date credentials for all communi-
cation partners is a challenge. Currently the only op-
tion is Secure ACARS [34], an implementation of AMS
that comes at a surcharge to the ACARS service. It
could be that this cost factor is key factor in its almost
non-existent deployment, even though the cost of the
investment is likely offset by the potential reputational
damage and legal costs.
While the temptation of cheap, proprietary
cryptography-based solutions is great (as observed in
use on some business jets [40]), weak encryption is to
be avoided at all costs. Providing the illusion of secu-
rity and no more, this approach detracts from the im-
portance of quickly deploying well-developed solutions
to aircraft.
The second option lies in the education of ACARS
users such that they transfer sensitive information in
another manner. Of course, this is not mutually exclu-
sive to using encryption, but is more likely to be de-
ployable in a timely fashion. It would require ACARS
users to identify the sensitive information transferred
and arrange other methods of transfer, if needed. A key
challenge here lies in continuing to provide services via
ACARS where sensitive information is crucial.
In the longer term, steps should be taken to move
away from ACARS completely. Since it was designed
with a significantly weaker threat model in mind—
i.e. one of no malicious activity—it is not equipped to
deal with cybersecurity threats. As discussed, uptake on
available security solutions has been limited, which in-
dicates that a newly developed data link with security
as the default, may be the better option. However, given
typical technological cycles in aviation, this would take
decades to deploy fully [43].
10 Related Work
Nearly a decade before avionics communication gained
interest in the scientific community, the United States
Air Force published concerns about the security and pri-
vacy of ACARS [33]. To keep military frequencies clear
for tactical communication, they propose an encryption
and authentication system to allow military aircraft to
communication over commercial data link.
Since this, work has highlighted the privacy and se-
curity issues of ACARS. Most recently, [39] highlighted
some anecdotal evidence for these issues indeed moti-
vating the more comprehensive approach taken in this
paper. In [41], the impact of ACARS being transmit-
ted in the clear is discussed specifically with respect
to the level of trust which can be placed in the link,
though without further quantification. Outside of the
academic community, ACARS has received some atten-
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tion at hacking conferences due to its lack of integrity
and authentication mechanisms [45].
A survey in the avionics community was conducted
in [42] to find how the actual users assess the security
and trustworthiness of the avionics protocols. Most re-
sponders believed the likelihood of attacks to be low
and trustworthiness was rated above average for most
protocols, including ACARS.
Privacy properties of the avionic surveillance sys-
tem ADS-B are investigated in [35, 36]. Since a passive
attacker can trivially receive ADS-B messages, they in-
vestigate the effectiveness of the standardized privacy
approach—identifier randomisation. They show that
knowledge of one identifier allows calculation of sub-
sequent identifiers for the same aircraft. Consequently,
they propose the usage of decorrelated random identi-
fiers to mitigate this.
Passenger privacy is not a purely aviation focussed
problem and does not restrict itself to public transport
either. In [32], the authors investigate the privacy and
security of current car sensor systems focussing on tire
pressure systems. An attacker is able to read the static
identifiers of the tire pressure sensors from tens of me-
ters away thus allowing tracking of individual vehicles
crossing the an attacker checkpoint. Exploting in-car
networks [21], discusses how an attacker can use the
CAN bus to extract data from the vehicle. Indeed, most
of these systems lack even basic security features.
11 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the privacy breaches arising
from ACARS usage. This is an important avionic data-
link system, used for both ATC and fleet management
purposes by a significant number of aircraft. Our results
demonstrate significant breaches in normal usage of the
system. For example, we observed non-commercial air-
craft undermining their efforts to limit public infor-
mation on their flights by openly transmitting with
ACARS. In the commercial case we saw transmission
of very sensitive data such as credit card details and
medical information. In order to evaluate these breaches
we propose a framework which identifies aviation stake-
holder groups and ties them to privacy concepts. Using
this we show that every instance of a privacy require-
ment is either breached or has strong evidence of such
a breach, for each stakeholder.
Based on our findings, we highlight that ACARS
alone is not responsible for leaking information—
instead, it is a combination of lacking a secure default
and misuse by users. We propose that in order to address
this, stakeholders need to push for use of ACARS Mes-
sage Security implementations such as Secure ACARS
and in cases where they are operating over an unsecured
link, be wary of the sensitivity of the information they
are transmitting. In the longer term, however, ACARS
should be replaced with a data link better suited to a
modern threat model.
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